ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

The profession of the law in this country, though from its inherent
arduous character, and perhaps even yet somewhat from its traditional conservatism, more difficult of access than business of other
kinds, is nevertheless practically free and open to all comers. So
far there is perhaps no reason to complain of the results -f the
experiment, for the tone of the American Bar is still as high and
as honorable as that of the English, and wihether that were so or
not, it would be neither possible nor desirable to give it those
exclusive features which have always been its distinctive character
in England. Moreover, the examination which is most strenuously
advocated there, has in more or less public manner, and with
greater'or less stringency, long obtained in all the States of the
Union; and it is perhaps to this, as much as to anything else, that
we owe the learning ard character of our Bar.
But it is matter of grave thought whether a more definite organization of the Bar, both State and National, could not be devised,
which, without interfering with individual liberty of action, might
yet be of service in increasing and perpetuating its reputation and
character as an honorable profession. In this view the experience
of our brethren in England is worthy of careful observation and
discussion.
J. T. M.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.'

Release of Mortgaged Premisesbj .Bolderoffirst .ncumbrance-Notce
of subseguent lncumbrance.-Where a mortgagee, with knowledge of a
subsequent mortgage on a part of the premises mortgaged to him, releases
a part or the whole of the premises not covered by the subsequent mortgage, and the remaining property is not sufficient to pay both, equity will
postpone the payment of the first mortgage out of the proceeds of a sale
of the remaining property to the extent of the injury done the subsequent
mortgagee by the release: James vs. Brown.
But the rule of notice in such case is different from the rule equity
From Hon. T. M. Cooley, Reporter, to appear in 11 Michigan Reports.
F
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acts on io protect bona f le purchasers. Where one purchases property
which was subject to an equity in the seller's hands, it is enough that he
have knowledge of such facts and circumstances indicating the equity as
would have led a prudent man to inquire in regard to it, and that he
omitted to do so; while in the case of mortgages, the existence of the
second mortgage should be clearly brought home to the knowledge of the
first mortgagee, in such a way that any act injuriously affecting the interests of the subsequent mortgagee will show an intentional disregard of
the interests of such subsequent mortgagee: id.
Assignment for benefit of Creditors.-A clause in a general assignment
for the benefit of creditors, empowering the assignee to sell the assigned
property on credit, renders it void: Sutton vs. Cleveland.
Constitutional Law-" Due Process of Law."-The provision in the
Constitution that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," as applied to proceedin s of a judicial
character, was intended to secure to the citizen the right to a trial, according to the forms of law, of the questions of his liability and responsibility
before his person or his property shall be condemned: Parsonsvs. Russell.
The trial must be by an impartial tribunal, and judgment must precede
the deprivation of property: Id.
Under the Boat and Vessel Law of this State, a vessel may be seized
and sold upon the mere assertion of a debt or demand, without any proof
to substantiate the claim being made before a judicial tribunal, and without any judgment or decree of any such tribunal allowing the sale. It
is therefore in conflict with the constitutional provision above quoted, and
void: 1d.
Statute of Frauds-Promiseto answer for the Debt, &c., of another.
-A written undertaking to answer for the debt or default of another
must show the terms of the contract without a resort to parol evidence,
or it is invalid: .Hallvs. Soule.
A parol promise to pay the debt of another, being void, cannot constitute
a legal consideration for a subsequent promise in writing: Id.
False Assertion of Yalue may be the Subject of a Suit-Bill of Sale
does not exclude Parol Evidence.-A mere assertion of value made by the
seller, when no warranty is intended, is no ground of relief to a purchaser,
because the assertion is a matter of opinion which does not imply knowledge, and in which men differ. Every person reposes at his peril in tho
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opinions of others, when he has equal opportunity to form and exercise
his own judgment: .Picardvs. McCormick.
But it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that value !s never a mate.
rial fact: 1d.
And when the purchaser expressly relies upon the knowledge of the
seller as to quality or value, the seller is bound to act honorably and deal
fairly with the purchaser. Wrhen confidence -is reposed in him he is
bound not to abuse it, and the rule of caveat emptor does not apply: Id.
A jeweller,' knowing the purchaser's ignorance, deliberately and designedly availed himself of it to defraud him by false statements of the
value of articles in his trade which none but an expert could reasonably
be expected to understand. Held, that an action would lie for the fraud:
Jd.
Value may be the subject of a warranty in a contract of sale: Id.
A simple bill of sale 'does not embody the preliminaries nor the essential terms of a contract in such a way as to exclude parol evidence. It is
designed merely to show the transfer of title: Id.
And when a contract of sale is in writing, if the seller has been dishonest in the transaction, the purchaser may disregard the writing, and
sue directly for the fraud: Id.
Right of a Married Woman to engage generally in Business.-D., a
married woman, being the owner of a grist-mill, her husband, as her
agent, entered into the business of buying, flouring, and selling wheat on
a large scale, which was carried on mostly on the credit of the business,
and with money derived therefrom. The husband being indebted, one
of his creditors levied upon some of the personal property in the business
as his. The wife having brought suit against the officer for this property,
it was held, that the Statute of 1855, empowering a married woman to
contract, sell, and dispose of her property the same as if she were unmarried, did not empower her to engage generally in a business of this cha
racter, so as to make the proceeds her own: Glover vs. Alcott.
License Fee not a Tax.-An ordinance of the city of Detrqit prohibited the sale of meats at other places than the public market without
first obtaining a license, for which a fee of five dollars was charged. This
ordinance was attacked as void, because imposing a tax not apportioned
as provided by the Constitution. Held, that the license fee was not a
*ax, but a reasonable compensation demanded by the city from those not
selling in the public markets, for the additional labor of its officers, and
expense thereby imposed: Ash vs. People.
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Seduction of a Woman who had been seduced before.-Au act of illicit
intercourse to which the woman submits solely in consequence of a promise of marriage then made, constitutes the statutory crime of seduction,
notwithstanding the woman had been before seduced on a similar promise:
People vs. Atillspaugh.
,Stare decisis-otce before Suit to one who contiuves a Nuisane.The Court is not bound to follow as precedents adjudications outside the
State-except the adjudications of the Federal Courts on questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the Federal Government-any
further than appear to the Court to be warranted by the fundamental
principles of the common law: Caldwell vs. Gale.
The question discussed, whether, where one erects a dam on his own
land which causes the land of another to be flowed, and then conveys the
land on which the dam is situated, a suit can -be brought against his
grantee for the nuisance before he has been served with notice of it and
requested to remove it: Id.
If such notice be necessary, and has once been given by the owner of
the land flowed, it will enure for the'benefit of his grantee, or of any one
claiming title under or through the person giving the notice: .d.
Reading Books of Reports to a .Jury.-On a question whether a draft
was presented for payment within a reasonable time, counsel was allowed
to read to the jury, and comment upon, books of reports. Held to be
erroneous: Phwenix Ins. Co. vs. Allen.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Administrator-Relation to Heirs at Law.-The administrator of an
estate, the personal property of which is more than sufficient for the payment of debts, stands in no fiduciary relation to the heir at law; and
they cannot maintain a bill in equity to compel him to give to them the
benefit of a purchase of real estate by him from one who had orally agreed
to sell the same to the intestate: Gay and Others vs. Gyy and Another.
Estate of Husband-Claim of Widow-Ante-nuptial Agreement.-It
is no answer to the claim of a widow to a distributive share in the personal
estate left by her husband, to show that she made an ante-nuptial agreement with him, by which she covenanted to accept certain provisions
therein undertaken to be made for her by him, in the place of and as a
I From Charles Allen, Esq., leporter, to appear in Vol. 5 --f his Reports.
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substitute for dower in his estate, and as a bar and estoppel to aiy and
every other claim by her upon his estate: Sullings vs. Richmond ana
Another.
Trust Estate-Continuanceof Business by Trustees-All the Profits of
Business not Income-Construction of Intention.-If, under a bequest of
the residue of the testator's property to trustees, with a general direction
to keep the same safely invested, and distribute the income to certain persons for life, with remainder over, an investment made by the testator in
a limited partnership has been allowed by the trustees to continue, the
profits arising therefrom after his death are not to be treated exclusively
as income; but so much thereof is to be treated and invested as principal, as, if received and invested at the testator's death, would amount,
with interest and making annual rests, to the profits actually received ai
the time they were received, and the residue is to be distributed as income: Kinmonth vs. Brigham and Another.
An intention on the part of a testator that an investment made by him
in a limited partnership should be continued after his death, and the
share of the profits belonging to his estate should, be distributed as income, under a general direction that his property should be kept safely
invested, and the income thereof distributed to certain persons for life,
with remainder over, will not be inferred from a clause in his will directing his executors not to avail themselves, unless they should see fit, of a
provision in the partnership articles, authorizing him or his representatives
to assume the management of the business, in case of the death of either
of the general partners: Id.
Partners-Guaranteeof Private Debt.-The guarantee by a firm of a
private debt of one of the partners, if made in contemplation of insolvency, is not a debt which can be proved against the joint estate, by a
creditor who knew that the firm was insolvent: Phillips vs. Ames and
Another.
Note- Whether of Company or of Officer signing it.-A note in this
form,-" $6831.46. Boston, Nov. 12, 1860. Six months after date, we
promise to pay to the order of A. B. six hundred -and thirty-one dollars,
value received. Mass. Steam Heating Co. L. L. F., Treasurer,"-is the
note of the company, and does not bind L. L. F. personally: Draper
and Another vs. Mass. Steam Beating Co. and Another.
Draft-Busband and Wife-Personal Liability.-An indorsement of
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a draft by a husband to his wife, and her subsequent indorsement of it,
with his assent, to a third person, are sufficient to vest in the latter a valid
title: Slawson vs. Loring.

A draft in this form,-"Office of the P. L. Manuf. Co., Hancock,
Mich., June 5th, 1861. E. T. L., agent. At four months' sight, pay,
&c., and charge the same to account of this company," signed "I. R. J.,
agent," and accepted by "E. T. L., agent,"-biuds the acceptor personally:
Td..
Note payable by Instalments-

Grace-Mortgage-When Condition

broken.-The maker of a note which is payable by instalments, at future
times certain, with interest, is entitled to grace both on the principal and
interest; and the condition of a mortgage given to secure the payment
of the same sums and. interest at the same times, is not broken 'until the
expiratiQn of the grace which is allowed upon the Dnote: Coffin vs. LoringTrespass-Erection of- Bay- Window-Bighway.-An owner of land

may maintain an action for the erection of a bay-window which extends
over his line, by the "adjoining owner, although that portion of his land
which is covered by the bay-window has been laid out and is used as a
highway; and evidence of a custom so to erect bay-windows is inadmissible: Codman and Others vs. Evans.
Equity Jurisdiction- General Statutes, c. 145, § 16-Disretion in
Location of Road- What may be included in Authority to' Construct a

Road.-The remedy under Gen. Sts., c. 145, § 16, by an application for
leave to file an information in the nature of a guo warranto to redress an
injury to private rights or interests by the exercise by a private corporation of a franchise or privilege not conferred by law, does not deprive this
Court of its jurisdiction in equity in case of a private nuisance: Pall
River _Iron Works Co. vs. Old Colony and Fall River Railroad.

Under a charter which fixes one terminus of a railroad at or near a
certain point, a large discretion is conferred upon the railroad company in
locating their road, the exercise of which will not be revised by this Court
unless they have clearly exceeded its just limits or acted in bad faith;
and where a charter authorized a railroad company to extend, locate, construct, and maintain a railroad "from a point at or near the present terminus of its track in Fall River, in a southerly direction, to the line of
the State of Rhode Island," a location starting at a point 2475 feet, by
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the line of the railroad, northerly from the termination of the old track,
is authorized: Id.
An unrestricted grant of authority to construct a railroad from one
designated point to another carries with it the authority to cross a navigable stream, if the railroad cannot reasonably be constructed without
doing so: .Id.
Corporation
?- SockhIlder-Euity- Statute of 1861, c. 156.-A
stockholder in a corporation, the charter of which, by Stat. 1831, c. 81,
is subject to alteration, amendment, or repeal, at the pleasure of the
Legislature, cannot maintain a bill in equity to restrain the corporation
from engaging in a new enterprise, in addition to that contemplated by the
charter, but of the same kind, if it is sanctioned by an express legislative
grant, and by a vote of the majority of the stockholders: Durfce vs. Old
Colony and Fall River Railroad Co.
A lease by the Newport and Fall River Railroad Company, a corporation established under the laws of Rhode Island, to the Old Colony and
Fall River Railroad Company, a corporation established under the laws
of this Commonwealth, of the unfinished railroad of the former corporation, situated in Rhode' Island, for a term of years, at an annual rent,
after the same shall have been completed, with a stipulation for the payment in advance of the rent for the whole term, to be used for the purpose of building the road and putting it in order for use, is not a violation of Stat. 1861, c. 156, which authorizes the latter corporation to
extend their railroad to the line of Rhode Island, to connect with a railroad to be constructed from Newport, Rhode Island, to the line of Massachusetts, and provides that no part of their present reserved funds shall
be appropriated to build any portion of the road in Rhode Island: Id.
SUPREME

COURT OF NEW YORK.'

Lease and Sub-lease-Right to Re-enter.-An under lease, by the lessee
of premises, for the whole unexpired term, reserving the right to re-enter,
is a sub-lease, and not an assignment; and the party giving the sub-lease
can re-enter for a breach of the condition, although there is no reversion
remaining in him: People ex rel. Elston vs. Robertson.
A lease was for the term of ten years, to commence on the 1st day of
.May, 1852, and to end on te 1st day of MJay, 1862. W., the assignee
of the lessee, underlet the premises to E., from the 1st day of May, 1856,
I From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, to be reported in Vol. 39 of his

Reports
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.o the 1st day of May, 1862. W. then assigned the original to 11. Held,
that the original lease was to be constiud as expiring at 12 o'clock I.
of the 1st of May, 1862, and the sub-lease as expiring at 12 o'clock at
night of the 30th of April, 1S62. And that consequently there was a
period of time between the end of the 30th of April and 12 ms.of the 1st
of May, during which R. had the right of re-entry and of possession of
the premises: Xd.
Jurisdton. - Costs on Dismissal-Injunction- Udertaing.-Tlhe
want of jurisdiction in the Court over the subject-matter of the action
will not prevent the defendant from recovering costs, on the dismissal of
the complaint; nor will it deprive the defendant of the -ight to damages
upon the injunction-undertaking, "when the injunction is dissolved: The
Cumberland Coal and Iron Co. vs. The Hoffman Steam Coal Co.
The undertaking given on the issuing of an injunction is for the benefit of all the defendants that are enjoined, whether served or not. Hence,
if a party, without any service of the summons or injunction upon him,
obeys the injunction, he 'may, without any appearance, have a reference
to ascertain the amount of damages sustained by him, by reason of the
injunction : Id.
Guardians-TheirCommssions.-It is not an inflexible rule that the
commissions of a guardian cover everything which can be allowed to him
for his services respecting the estate of his ward: Morgan vs. Morgan.
The rule is not so narrow and restricted that it denies all compensation
to a guardian for services of a personal or professional nature, rendered
by him for the benefit of the ward, and in doing which he has bestowed
personal labor and incurred actual expenses, and which have been useful
and serviceable to the estate : Id.
Promissory Notes.-Where, after two persons had signed i promissoiry
note, not negotiable, a third person wrote his name across the back, and
it was thereupon transferred to the payee, who paid value for it: Eld,
that the person so writing his name upon the back of the note was not
an indorser, nor a guarantor, but was a joint promissor with the other
signers; the precise locality of his signature upon the note being immhterial: Richards vs. Warring.
Landlord and Tenant-Eviction-Aportonment of Rent-Recoup.
ment.-Where a lessee has been evicted from a portion of the privileges
granted by the lease, by a paramount title in a stranger, he is discharged
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from the rent pro tanto, and is entitled to an apportionment, by which rent
shall be paid only in respect to the residue: Carter vs. Burr.
But in an action for rent, the lessee is not entitled to recoup the value
of the lease over and above the rent, nor for rents he might have received,
or for special damages incurred by reason of being evicted from a portion
,of the privileges granted: Id.
A lease in fee or in perpetuity is a "conveyabce of real estate," 'within
the provisions of the statute forbidding the implication of covenants;
and if it contains no covenants of seisin, warranty, or quiet enjoyment,
none can be implied: Id.
S errfl-Liabiltty for neglecting to return an Execution-Measure of
Damages.-Where a sheriff neglects to collect and return an execution
within the time prescribed by law, he is liable to the plaintiff for the
damages sustained by his neglect; unless he can show that the defendant
in the execution had no property out of which he could have collected
the debt: Bowman vs. Cornell, Sheri &c.
The action against the sheriff, in such a case, is founded upon his neglect to return the execution, and the amount of the execution is the measure of damages: Id.
When a right of action has accrued against a sheriff, for neglecting to
return an execution, such right cannot be divested by an appeal being
taken from the judgment by the defendant therein, even though the
appeal be brought prior to the commencement of the action: Id.
Recognisance in a Criminal Case.-A recognisance, taken in a criminal case, conditioned that the prisoner shall appear at the next Court of
Oyer and Terminer, to answer to an indictment; that he shall "not
depart without leave of the Court ;" and that he shall "1abide its order
and decision ;" by its terms requires his appearance on the first day of
term, and de die in diem during its continuance, unless discharged by
the Court: The People vs. McCoy.
If the prisoner appears in Court, answers when called, and, without
having been surrendered by his bail or ordered into the custody of the
sheriff, enters upon his trial, but before the same is finished he departs
from the Court without leave, and does not return again to abide the order
and decision of the Court, his recognisance is forfeited: Id.
A recognisance returnable "at the next Court of Oyer and Terminer,"
is not void for uncertainty. The next Court of Oyer and Terminer in
the county where the indictment was found and is triable, and in which
the recognisance was taken, will be deemed the one intended: Id.
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Volume XXVIII.

We have had occasion to state the merits of these reports so frequently,
of late, that it will not be necessary to repeat what we have before said.
This volume has a less number of pages than most of the preceding
volumes of Mr. Peck, but it contains, if we have not been misled by our
hasty examination, an unusual proportion of important questions, most
of which are decided, as we should judge, in conformity with established
precedents. To this, however, there are some few marked exceptions.
In the-case of Harrs vs. !M7Is,p. 44, it is decided that where a
prom.issoy note is secured by mortgage, and has become barred by the
Statute of Limitations, that no foreclosure of the equity of redemption will
be allowed in a court of equity, unless the mortgage contains a covenant
for the repayment of the money. This is at variance with several
decisions of the highest respectability in different states, and is not, so
far as we now recollect, supported by any authority, except the dictum
of Mr. Justice SUTMEMrAND in oJackson vs. Sackett, 7 Wendell R. 94,
which was never followed in that state. The cases where the contrary
doctrine is maintained, so far as now in mind, are Belknapp vs. Gleason,
11 Oonn. R. 160, 166; Aeyex vs. .Pruyn,7 Paige 465; Reid vs. Shepley,
6 Vt. Rep. 602.
We should, without examination, have said that the rate of. interest
allowable, for the non-payment of money at the time it fell due, was the
legal rate of interest of the place of payment, independent of all special
contract, as to the rate of interest before the time of paynent, where the
law allows the parties to stipulate for a higher rate of interest-than the
common rate. But in Angre vs. .McDaniel, p. 201, it was decided that
the stipulated rate will continue until judgment.
The decision in Stone vs. Atwood, p. 30, that a court of equity will
correct a mistake in an award of arbitrators so as to make it what the
arbitrators intended it should be, strikes us as stating the general principle too broadly. In the case before the court the real meaning cf the
award was apparent from the papers in the case, so that the result was
matter of construction merely. But we should hesitate about applying
that principle to cases where the intent of the arbitrators was to be made

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

out by extraneous evidence. In such cases we should not be willing to
allow that a court of equity could reform the award and make it conform
to the alleged, or proved, intent of the arbitrators. The chief ground
of the jurisdiction for reforming contracts, in courts of equity, is not the
mistake in making such contracts, but the fraud in the party in attempting to enforce them; and that seems in a measure to be wanting in the
case of awards of arbitrators. It is unquestionable that a mistaken award
may be set aside in a court of equity; but, without examining precedents,
we could not subscribe to the doctrine of the dictum of this case, that
after setting aside the mistaken award, a court of equity might set up the
award -iztended to have been made. The arbitrators must make their own
award, and not a court of equity, as it seems to us.
This volume contains many important decisions in regarcr to the duties
and liabilities of railway companies, the powers and duties of courts
of equity, and as to the duties arising from commercial guarantees and
other commercial paper. It would be impossible to refer to even the
I. F. R.
most important of the questions here determined.
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This volume, just issued by this well-known law-publishing house, and
done up in their usual neat and thorough style of law-book making, is
before us. It will be found indispensable to those who have availed
themselves of the former volumes of the work, which is regarded as the
only reliable source of learning the true state of the statute law of Congress, with convenient references to the decisions of the courts in regard
to them. This edition of the Acts of Congress has been made authoritative in all the courts of the country by special act, and has become
I. 9. R.
nearly indispensable in all well-ordered law libraries.

